How China’s Belt and Road Initiative is changing

On October 17th officials from at least 90 countries are expected to arrive in Beijing for a two-day diplomatic festival. The occasion is a summit organised by Xi Jinping, China’s president, to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), his most ambitious foreign-policy programme. It involves China financing billions of dollars of investment in roads, railways and other infrastructure across Eurasia and Africa. China claims the BRI has created 420,000 jobs and lifted 40m people out of poverty. But many in the West think its real purpose is to construct a Chinese-led world order in which unsavoury regimes can thrive. The guest list for this week’s summit resembles a gallery of rogues. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, will play a starring role. Various other strongmen have confirmed their attendance. Even the Taliban are sending a delegation. Does China’s BRI bankroll international development or cement autocracy?

Launched in 2013 as “one belt, one road”, the BRI quickly became a clear expression of Mr Xi’s determination to break with Deng Xiaoping’s dictum to “hide our capabilities and bide our time; never try to take the lead”. It seeks to make Eurasia (dominated by China) an economic and trading area to rival the transatlantic one (dominated by America). By investing in infrastructure, Mr Xi hoped to create new markets for Chinese companies, such as high-speed rail firms, and to export some of his country’s vast excess capacity in cement, steel and other metals. By investing in volatile countries in Central Asia, he sought to create a more stable neighbourhood for China’s own restive western regions of Xinjiang and Tibet. And by encouraging more Chinese projects around the South China Sea, the initiative aimed to bolster China’s claims in that area (the “road” in “belt and road” refers to sea lanes).